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EDITORIALS.
We take pleasure in a'nouncing that at a recent meeting the fol-
lowing men were elected to the Board: J. F. Malley, 'o2; J.
A. Turner, 'o3; C. W. Bronson, 'o3; and Franklin Carter, Jr., '03,
assistant business manager,
COMMENT.
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY.
Probably no branch of the law can show a greater development
during the last century than the law of privacy. From a strict adhe-
rence to the rule that a court of equity will not grant an injunction
except where property 'rights are affected, courts of equity have in
the last few years expressly recognized "the right to be alone," inde-
pendently of any property considerations.
At common law no remedy existed for a violation of one's 'Priv-
acy, no damages being predicable of mere mental disquietude.
The right of privacy in the enjoyment of real property has never
been questioned. Of other kinds of property; the right was first
recognized in the case of private letters, and was based upon a prop-
erty interest in them. Afterwards the court enjoined the unautho-
rized use of a name, and finally a wrong to one's personality,
Originally a court of equity would not interfere where an- action for
damages could not be brought, Southey v. Sherwood, 2 Mer. 437.
(1817). In the case of Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swa:'st. 4o2, a step in
departure from the strict property qualifications was taken. Relief
was held obtainable to restrain the violation of a personal legal right
which could be cognizable as property. The same theory was
advanced in Prince Albert v. Strange, I Mac. & G. 25. (1849),
where. Lord Cottenham repudiated the notion that an injunction
could not be granted unless an action would lie. All that was nec-
essary to found the jurisdiction of the court was held to be a direct
clear interference with a right clearly connected with property.
Finally in the case of Pollard v. Photographic Company, 40 Ch. D.
354 (1889), the court entirely receded from the old idea that a viola-
tion of property rights was necessary to the granting of relief. It
was held that the fight to grant, an injunction does not depend in
any way upon the existence of property, "nor is it," said the court,
"worth while to consider carefully the grounds upon which the old
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court of chancery used to interfere by injunction. But it is quite
clear, that independently of any question as to the right at law, the
court of .chancery always had an original and independent jurisdic-
tion to prevent what the court considered and treated as a wrong,
whether arising from a violation of an unquestioned right, or from
'breach of contract or confidence."
In the United States the right to privacy was recognized in the
case of Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434, but was held to be a purely
personal right which dies with the person, and this decision has
been followed by others. In Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. Rep. 290, the
court declares that individuals shall be secure in their "right to be
alone."
The right to privacy may, however, be waived by the individual.
A statesman, author, artist or inventor who asks for and desires
public recognition may be said to have surrendered this right to the
public. When any one obtains a picture or photograph of such a per-
son, and there is no breach of contract, or violation of confidence
in the method by which it was obtained, he has a right to reproduce
it, whether in a newspaper article, or book; Corliss v. E. W. Walker
Co., 64 Fed. Rep. 280. In the same case it is held that an injunc-
tion will not be granted to restrain the publication of the life of an
inventor, whether he be a public or private character, on the ground
that the freedom of the press is a constitutional right.
The latest decision on this subject is that in Roberson v. Roches-
ter Folding Box Company, 7 N. Y. Supp. 876. In this case, the
defendant without authority published and circulated lithographic
prints of plaintiff with advertisements of their business thereon,
whereby plaintiff was made the subject of scoffs and jeers, causing
her humiliation and sickness. The court, keeping pace with the
trend of modem judication granted the relief sought, upon the
ground that the plaintiff's personal comfort had been interfered with
without her consent and to her injury.
It seems clear from a study of these decisions, that courts of
equity are rapidly assuming the position of Lord Cottenham, who, in
Wallworth v. Holt, 4 Mylne & C. 619, said: "I think it is the
duty of this court to adopt its practice and course of proceeding to
the existing state of society, and not by too strict an adherence to
forms and rules established under different circumstances, to decline
to administer justice and enforce rights for which there is no remedy.
If it were necessary to go much further than it is, in opposition to
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some highly-sanctioned opinions, in order to open the door of justice
in this court to those who cannot obtain it elsewhere, I would not
shrink from the responsibility of doing so."
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISEEMENTS.
The death penalty for centuries has been the universal punish-
ment for many crimes. In the medieval period even the most
trivial breaches of the law were attoned for by the death of the cul-
prit. The advance of civilization, however, has been marked by the
decline of capital punishment, until in the majority of jurisdictions
it is imposed only in cases of treason and murder.
Notwithstanding the great abhorence for capital punishment,
the legislatures of many states, incited by the prevalence of certain
crimes or the particularly distressing details of some one crime, in
their respective states, have recently passed statutes imposing the
death penalty for crimes not usually punished with so great severity.
Notably, the Illinois statute, making kidnapping punishable by
death.
In view of this spirit of the legislatures, the case of Territory v.
Ketchum, 65 Pac. (N. Mex.) 169, becomes of more than passing
interest, since it raises the question of the limit to legislative discre-
tion in determining the severity of punishment of crime.
In this case the appellant was convicted of train robbery and
sentenced to death, in accordance with the provisions of Section
115i of the Compiled Laws of New Mexico. The single question
presented to the Supreme Court, was whether the death penalty, as
applied to this offense, is a "cruel and unusual punishment," within
the prohibition of the eighth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. The court decides that the section of The Compiled
Laws in question is not within the constitutional provision.
When the enormity of the crime is considered, the decision does
not impress one as unjust nor the punishment disproportionate.
But in arriving at this conclusion the court states that the discretion
of legislatures in determining the adequacy of punishment for crime
is unlimited.
Is this true, as a principle of law? If so, to apply it in an extreme
case, the legislatures may impose the death penalty forever a mis-
demeanor.
If there is any limitation upon this power of legislatures, it must
be imposed by the eighth amendment of the Constitution of the
United States or similar provisions in the state constitutions.
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That this provision applies to punishments of a barbarous char-
acter, such as burning at the stake and stretching on the rack, is
beyond doubt (Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130). That the death
penalty, in a proper case, if the mode of infliction is humane, is not
prohibited by this provision is equally well established. (In re
Kemmler, 136 U., S. 436).
But when it is sought to invoke the aid of this constitutional
provision, to prevent the infliction of punishment, excessive and dis-
prolportionate to the crime committed, the law is not so well defined.
This point has not been passed upon by the United States
Supreme Court. In the state courts, however, where the precise
question has arisen, the decisions have been uniform, that the provis-
ion against "cruel and unusual punishments" is applicable to the
mode of punishment and not to the decree. (Aldridge v. Com., 2
Va. Cas. 447; Com. v. Hutchings, 5 Gray 482; Com. v. Murphy, 165
Mass. 66; People v. Morris, 8o Mich. 634).
Such eminent authorities as Judge Cooley and Mr. Tiedeman
declare the question an open one. While a review of the authorities
would thus seem to confirm the decision of the Supreme Court of
New Mexico, nevertheless, some idea of the probable decision of the
question, should it ever be presented to the Supreme Court of the
United States, may be obtained from the dissenting opinion of
Justice Field in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, which was con-
curred in by Justices Harlan and Brewer. Justice Field, after
speaking of the application of the eighth amendment to the punish-
ments involving torture, said, "The inhibition is directed not only
against punishments of the character mentioned, but against all
punishments which, by their excessive length or severity, are greatly
disproportioned to the offense charged."
